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I. INTRODUCTION  
I am going to start this Article with two confessions.  First, when I
was fourteen, my favorite rock song was (Don’t Fear) The Reaper, by
Blue Oyster Cult.1  Second, one of my favorite Saturday Night Live 
(SNL) sketches is from the 2000 season, “Behind the Music: Blue Oyster 
Cult.”2  The sketch is a tribute in memory of Gene Frenkle, the member
of Blue Oyster Cult who played the cowbell on (Don’t Fear) The 
Reaper.  The SNL sketch purports to explain how the cowbell made it 
onto the studio recording.  In the sketch, members of the regular SNL
cast pretend to be Blue Oyster Cult, SNL regular Will Ferrell pretends to
be Frenkle, and guest host Christopher Walken pretends to be Bruce 
Dickinson, a famous record producer.3 Over and over, Bruce Dickinson 
stops recordings of (Don’t Fear) The Reaper because he “could’ve used
a little more cowbell.”4  He encourages Frenkle to “[r]eally explore the 
studio space” with the cowbell, tells the band “you’re gonna want
that cowbell on the track,” and pleads “I gotta have more cowbell!”5 
Even when the lead guitarist disagrees and picks a fight with Frenkle, 
Dickinson insists, “Guess what?  I got a fever!  And the only 
prescription . . . is more cowbell!”6 
I make these confessions to explain my general reaction to intellectual 
property (IP) law and scholarship.  I am a property scholar, and when I 
look at intellectual property I see it shot through with property concepts 
and policies.7  When he heard (Don’t Fear) The Reaper, Bruce 
Dickinson had to have more cowbell; when I read IP scholarship, I gotta 
have more property (P).
Given my fever for property, I was extremely gratified that Robert
Merges published Justifying Intellectual Property.  Merges makes two
major contributions.  One shows why it would be bad to take the P out 
1. BLUE OYSTER CULT, (Don’t Fear) The Reaper, on AGENTS OF FORTUNE (Sony 
Music Entm’t 1976). 
2. See Behind the Music: Blue Oyster Cult, SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE TRANSCRIPTS 
(April 8, 2000), http://snltranscripts.jt.org/99/99pcowbell.phtml (last visited Nov. 25,
2012).  Some of the sketch is available for online viewing at Will Ferrell’s 10 Best SNL
Skits Ever, HULU BLOG (May 11, 2012), http://blog.hulu.com/2012/05/11/will-ferrells-
10-best-snl-skits-ever/. 
3. “By the way, my name is Bruce Dickinson.  Yes, the Bruce Dickinson. . . .  I put 
my pants on just like the rest of you—one leg at a time.  Except, once my pants are on, I




7. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 
76 IND. L.J. 803 (2001) (contending that lawyers can learn about modern intellectual 
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of IP.  In Merges’s words, “there is a basic logic to the law of property,
and . . . it applies to intangibles as well as physical things.”8  Merges 
anticipates “a lot of resistance” to this thesis “from various quarters.”9 
I am nowhere near as diplomatic as Merges, so I will translate.
Although many IP scholars avoid taking sides, two small but noisy
contingents focus intensely on the relationship between P and IP.  I call 
one such contingent “P skeptics.”  P skeptics may respect the policies
associated with IP—the encouragement of technological innovation, the 
encouragement of artistic creation, and inventors’ and creators’ rightful 
priorities over what they have invented or created.  Yet P skeptics insist
that “IP is not P,” they complain that “this truth is lost on us,”10 and they
are skeptical that P concepts can help institute sensible IP policies.  By
contrast, “P essentialists” understand IP as a sensible and specialized
application of P.  If IP scholars object to the P in IP, it is not because IP 
and P are different but because P skeptics are Is.  P skeptics often assert
that legal P is “a government backed monopoly.”11  Yet this assertion is 
uncharitable if P is understood sensibly.  The assertion is best understood 
not as a scholarly argument but as an effort to shape popular opinion—to
delegitimize P-based IP, and to legitimize instead a regime in which Is 
use I expertise to administer disputes about I works.
In Justifying Intellectual Property, Merges sets himself against the P 
skeptics and with the P essentialists.  Merges defends vigorously the
patent system, the copyright system, and the worthiness of the creative
professionals who use both to produce intellectual works of general
value.  Merges’s account supplies the best defense of which I am aware 
in recent scholarship why inventors and artists deserve property in their 
intellectual works.12 
I would have been happy simply with Merges’s first thesis, but for me 
the second was even better—maybe like a secret bonus track.  Most IP 
scholars tend, as William Landes and Richard Posner put it, to be 
“skeptical that . . . noneconomic theories of intellectual property have 
much explanatory power or normative significance.”13  Merges earned 
8. MERGES, supra note *, at 4. 
9. Id. 
10. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1798 (2002). 
11. Id. 
12. See MERGES, supra note *, at 195–236. 
13. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 















   
 
 










his (deserved) preeminence in IP scholarship within these conventional 
parameters, as an economic scholar of law.14  Yet in Justifying Intellectual 
Property, Merges claims to have “come to see” that “[m]aximizing
utility . . . is not a serviceable first-order principle of the IP system.  It is
just not what IP is really all about at the deepest level.”15  Instead, 
Merges argues that property claims in IP law depend vitally on 
noneconomic theories of rights, especially Lockean labor theory,
Kantian theories of autonomy, and Rawlsian theories of distributive 
justice.16  I am not well versed in the latter two theories, but I do know
enough about Lockean labor theory17 to say that Merges’s treatment of it 
is quite good.18 
And yet . . . I could have used a little more property.  Although 
Justifying Intellectual Property is insightful in many respects, in a few
respects its arguments do not sufficiently connect rights-based property
theory to contemporary IP law and scholarship.  To be clear, these gaps
are not grave defects in the book.  Most American IP scholars, like most 
American legal scholars generally, have little feel for how legal doctrine 
implements moral theories of rights.  Merges is therefore calling
attention to scholarly questions that IP scholars will need to explore after 
they have absorbed the book’s primary claims and contributions.  Yet
these questions do exist, and they could lead likely skeptics or critics of 
Justifying Intellectual Property unwarrantedly to dismiss the book’s 
main intentions and accomplishments. 
14. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (5th ed. 2010); 1 ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
(Robert P. Merges ed., 2007); 2 ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Robert P. 
Merges ed., 2007); Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face 
of Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145 (2011); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into
Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
15. MERGES, supra note *, at 3. 
16. See id. at 9–23. 
17. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, 
and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1398–430 (2010); Eric R. 
Claeys, Productive Use in Acquisition, Accession, and Labor Theory, in  THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (James E. Penner & Henry E. Smith
eds., forthcoming) [hereinafter Claeys, Productive Use in Accession], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066166; Eric R. Claeys, The Private Society and the Liberal 
Public Good in John Locke’s Thought, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 201 (Ellen Frankel 
Paul et al. eds., 2008). 
18. Accord Gordon Hull, Robert Merges: Justifying Intellectual Property, 14 ETHICS &
INFO. TECH. 169, 169 (2012) (book review) (“[A]nybody who cares about how our
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Merges is convincing when he argues that Lockean labor theory can 
supply a normative foundation for IP rights.19  He is also convincing
when he presents the relation between property theory and IP practice as
a three-layer cake.20  In this cake metaphor, normative theory or theories 
supply a foundational layer.21  In the middle layer, “midlevel principles” 
convert rights-based foundations into general presumptions or working 
principles.22  On the top layer, “specific practices” specify how midlevel 
presumptions or ideals apply to particular repeat-act situations in a single 
field of law.23  The least satisfying part of Merges’s argument is the step 
where he gives an account of IP’s midlevel principles.  This step is the 
place where legal doctrine starts to implement prescriptions from rights-
based theory.  Here, I suggest, Merges is gonna want more property. 
When IP scholars search for relevant midlevel principles, I suspect,
the most important principles will be property principles.  Merges
identifies one of those principles, “nonremoval,” or the ideal that, other
things being equal, information already in the public domain should not 
be removed and converted to private property.24  Yet the other three
(nonproperty) midlevel principles Merges proposes have little explanatory 
or justificatory potential.  And Merges does not consider other property-
based midlevel principles that, I suspect, have more explanatory and 
justificatory potential. 
There are two possible ways in which I could substantiate my praises 
and concerns.  The long way would be for me to write my own book
explaining what I regard as the right relation between property
foundations and midlevel principles in IP.  I am not in a position to do so
now,25 I may never be, and in any case this symposium would not be the
proper venue to publish what is a book-length claim. So here, I will take 
19. MERGES, supra note *, at 31–67. 
20. See id. at 14 fig.1.1. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See id.; see also id. at 5–23 (describing the relationship between Merges’s three 
layers of IP theory).
24. See id. at 141–43. 
25. For articles in which I discuss related issues, see Eric R. Claeys, Private Law 
Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L., Oct. 2011, art. 2 [hereinafter
Claeys, Private Law Theory], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1799554; and Eric R.
Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs: Trade Secrets, Hot News, and the Usufructuary Paradigm at
Common Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyam Balganesh ed., 




























   
  
   
   
the short way—a close critique of one representative point of contact 
between Merges’s approach and mine. 
That point of contact is the remedy question litigated in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.26 The eBay case illustrates a debate that pervades
discussions of remedies for property torts: If a property owner (in eBay, 
a patent holder) suffers repeat invasions of property rights (in eBay, 
ongoing patent infringement),27 is the owner entitled to an injunction 
against the invasion more or less as a matter of course, or must the 
owner prove he deserves an injunction prima facie more or less as he
must prove liability prima facie?28  Utilitarian IP scholars debate the 
trade-offs between these two positions using terminology associated
with property rules and liability rules: the presumptive-injunction 
position is the “property rule” position, and the no-presumption position 
is the “liability rule” position.29  Applying Lockean labor theory and the
midlevel proportionality principle, Merges concludes that patent owners 
should often be limited to a damage remedy, that is, a liability rule.30 
II. THE EBAY ISSUE 
Let me first briefly recount the eBay case, explain the doctrinal
choices it raises, and recount how Merges applies his framework to those 
choices.  eBay runs an auction website, and it was found liable for
infringing business method patents held by MercExchange.31  If  
MercExchange had been awarded equitable relief, it was at least possible 
that such relief would have shut down eBay’s operations and wreaked
financial hardship on eBay.  The district court denied MercExchange’s
motion for a permanent injunction.32  It did not make specific findings
about the hardship to eBay; instead, it found relevant to the hardships 
that MercExchange “exists solely to license its patents or sue to enforce
its patents, and not to develop or commercialize them.”33  The Federal
Circuit reversed, applying a “general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”34 
26. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
27. Id. at 390–94. 
28. See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1349–74 (4th ed. 2008). 
29. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972). 
30. See MERGES, supra note *, at 166–67. 
31. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390–91.  An eBay subsidiary, which I will disregard in 
text, was also found liable. Id.
32. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 715 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 388. 
33. Id. at 714. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s
so-called general rule, and it reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment.35 
Recounting “well-established principles of equity,” the Court reasoned 
that all litigants seeking an injunction must satisfy a four-part test
covering irreparable injury, the inadequacy of ordinary legal remedies, 
the balance of hardships, and the public interest.36 Unanimously, the
Court criticized the Federal Circuit for “articulat[ing] a ‘general rule,’ 
unique to patent disputes,” and insisted that parties follow the four-factor
test as it applies wherever equitable relief is available.37 
Since this holding was so spare, two concurring opinions tried to
construe the Court opinion to teach two conflicting lessons.  Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, encouraged the 
Federal Circuit and other lower courts to apply the four factors 
presumptively favoring property rules.  Specifically, Roberts explained,
courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast 
majority of patent cases . . . given the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude
through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an invention against
the patentee’s wishes—a difficulty that often implicates the first two factors of
the traditional four-factor test.38 
Yet Justice Kennedy encouraged lower courts to avoid favoring 
property rules or liability rules.  Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, Kennedy argued that the historical practice recounted by Roberts 
was not obviously relevant to contemporary practice.39  In some fields,  
Kennedy warned, patent holders use the threat of “an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation . . . as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy 
licenses to practice the patent.”40  “When the patented invention is but a 
small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the 
threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations,” Kennedy warned, “legal damages may well be sufficient
to compensate for the infringement.”41 
35. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390–91. 
36. Id. at 391. 
37. Id. at 393–94. 
38. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 

























   
     
In Justifying Intellectual Property, Merges interprets the eBay case as 
a practical illustration for one of his midlevel principles: proportionality.42 
As Merges defines the principle, an IP right “must not confer on its 
holder leverage or power that is grossly disproportionate to what is 
deserved in the situation.”43  Merges illustrates with a folksy analogy to
a bridge dispute.  He asks the reader to imagine that bridge builders 
accidentally trespass on the land of a riparian named Al, who then holds 
out for most of the value of the bridge.44  As Al gouges the bridge
builders, so patentees gouge idea users.  Merges finds the Federal
Circuit’s pre-eBay approach “quite unfair,” for it enabled patentees to 
use “excessive leverage” to extract wealth from parties assembling ideas 
under many different patents into a new and useful product.45  Merges 
finds Justice Kennedy’s approach consistent with the proportionality
principle because the approach scales a patentee’s remedies to the 
patent’s “intrinsic value.”46 Because neither Al nor the holder of the bit-
part patent “incur[s] significant investments for a socially constructive 
purpose,” both have “done little in the way of work, risk, or investment
to deserve” the leverage an injunction provides.47 
III. REMEDY DOCTRINES IN PROPERTY TORTS 
The issue raised by eBay is a difficult one to settle, for it is a lightning 
rod for two different normative worldviews about property regulation.
Theories of justice may be sorted by whether they promote strong 
conceptions of individual rights or strong demands of community.
Theories of economics may be sorted by whether they focus primarily
on “the problem of order” or on “the maximization of welfare.”48  In
general, normative theories may be sorted by whether they assume
“constrained” or “unconstrained” views of human knowledge and 
perfectibility.49  Lawyers who find agreeable the latter alternative in each 
of those three pairings are by definition predisposed to the no-
presumption position; those who prefer the former alternative are
similarly predisposed to the presumptive-injunction position. 
42. See MERGES, supra note *, at 165–66. 
43. Id. at 162. 
44. Id. at 162–65. 
45. Id. at 161. 
46. Id. at 166. 
47. Id. at 167. 
48. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 398 (2001). 
49. See THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL
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Before explaining how this conflict of visions informs the relevant 
philosophical questions, let me start by showing how it informs the 
relevant doctrine.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in eBay inclines toward the 
more unconstrained view.  Yet prominent legal authorities validate the 
constrained approach as well.50  Let me start in the field of real property, 
with Merges’s bridge example.51  In the law regulating real property 
disputes,52 many authorities presume that a property owner deserves an
injunction against an ongoing trespass unless the owner disentitles 
himself by unclean hands or some other inequitable conduct of his 
own.53  Under these authorities, Al presumptively deserves an injunction. 
But would that injunction encourage Al to gouge the bridge builders? 
Not necessarily, for at least two reasons.  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts identified one: 
The protection by injunction of property rights against continuing trespasses 
by encroaching structures has sometimes been based upon the danger that a 
continuance of the wrong may ripen into title by adverse possession or a right of
prescription. . . .  But the basic reason lies deeper.  It is the same reason “which
lies at the foundation of the jurisdiction for decreeing specific performance of
contracts for the sale of real estate.  A particular piece of real estate cannot be
replaced by any sum of money, however large; and one who wants a particular
estate for a specific use, if deprived of his rights, cannot be said to receive an
exact equivalent or complete indemnity by the payment of a sum of money.
A title to real estate, therefore, will be protected in a court of equity by a decree
which will preserve to the owner the property itself, instead of a sum of money 
which represents its value.”54 
In commonsensical terms, in the bridge dispute, a damages-only remedy
avoids the error of commission; it protects the court from being
complicit in efforts by Al to hold out for a disproportionate share of a
project that he did not assemble.  Yet the injunction avoids the error of
omission.  Because Al has “property” in his land, it seems “odd to claim 
that [Al’s] right is protected when [the bridge builders are] permitted to
50. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-
Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 1, 5–8 (2012) (arguing 
that government regulatory approaches “upset the current set of well-functioning private 
coordination activities in the IP marketplace that are needed to accomplish the
commercialization of new technologies”).
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
52. I mean “law” here such that it encompasses the principles of common law that
regulate the issuance of injunctions and other equitable relief. 
53. See, e.g., Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223, 229–30 (Md. 1936). 
54. Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726, 727–28 (Mass. 1935) (citations
omitted) (quoting Lynch v. Union Inst. for Sav., 34 N.E. 364, 364–65 (Mass. 1893)). 
1041


















   







   
 
force a transfer at a price set by third parties.”55 The presumptive-
injunction rule prevents that oddity.  It declares that the rights to
determine whether to sell, on what terms, and at what price all inhere
presumptively in Al’s “property.”
Separately, although equity can consider the hardship on an enjoined 
encroacher, it does so only if the encroacher encroaches more or less
blamelessly.  As the Colorado Supreme Court put it:
Where the encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful and intentional
taking of another’s land, equity may well require its restoration regardless of the 
expense of removal as compared with damage suffered therefrom; but where the 
encroachment was in good faith, we think the court should weigh the circumstances
so that it shall not act oppressively. . . .  While the mere balance of convenience 
is not the proper test, yet relative hardship may properly be considered and the 
court should not become a party to extortion.56 
Here, the court respects not only Merges’s proportionality principle but
also the desire “not [to] become a party to extortion.”  Yet as applied to 
the bridge dispute, the court would not indulge that desire without first 
investigating whether the bridge builders’ encroachment was “deliberate,”
“willful,” or “intentional.”  If it were, Al’s plea for an injunction would 
not count as “extortion” but as a legitimate response to a “taking.” 
This debate recurs in IP law and scholarship.  Many if not most IP 
scholars probably approve of Justice Kennedy’s argument that 
permanent damages—liability rules—provide the right remedies for 
patentees who do not commercialize their patents.57  Yet other academic
commentators insist that injunctions—property rules—are as appropriate
in patent law as they are elsewhere in property law.58  Their views and 
Chief Justice Roberts’s views have considerable support in relevant 
remedy case law.  In particular, in the Continental Paper Bag case, the
Court held that a patentee deserved an injunction over the infringer’s 
55. Jules Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1335, 1338 (1986). 
56. Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951) (en banc) (citations 
omitted).
57. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2036 (2007) (“We think that one circumstance in which courts should
consider denying an injunction—or at a minimum delaying it—is when the product that 
would be enjoined contains multiple components, of which only one is the subject of 
patent suit.”); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules 
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 841 (2007) (“As an initial matter, we believe 
that courts should recognize that there are core cases where they can and should superintend 
liability rules effectively.”).
58. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 50, at 1–5, 19 (rejecting damages as sufficient to
protect rights of patentees); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1781–82 (2007) (“[T]he presumption 
for injunctions should be stronger than that suggested by the traditional realist
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argument that the patentee had not used the patent.59  The Court
dismissed the infringer’s argument by reasoning from the basic structure 
of the patent.60  According to the Court:
The patent law is the execution of a policy having its first expression in the
Constitution, and it may be supposed that all that was deemed necessary to 
accomplish and safeguard it must have been studied and provided for.  It is
worthy of note that all that has been deemed necessary for that purpose, through
the experience of years, has been to provide for an exclusive right to inventors
to make, use and vend their inventions.  In other words, the language of complete 
monopoly has been employed, and though at first only a remedy at law was given
for a violation of the right, a remedy in equity was given as early as 1819.61 
In short, when the patentee has justifiable property in a patent, the 
patentee’s legal “property” consists of a “complete monopoly.”  From 
that “monopoly” follows a right to decide whether and on what terms to 
commercialize the invention under patent, and—at least ordinarily— 
even a nonusing patentee deserves the benefit of these presumptions. 
The tension between these two views of patent remedies creates 
significant problems for Justifying Intellectual Property.  When Merges
insists that efficiency is not “what IP is really all about at the deepest 
level,”62 implicitly, he suggests that rights- and fairness-based approaches
do get at what IP is “all about.”  Other things being equal, the book’s 
account of proportionality and eBay should be able to explain not only
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in eBay but also the Continental Paper Bag
case,63 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in eBay,64 and the principles of 
equity from real property law.65  Merges’s failures to do so detract from
Justifying Intellectual Property’s explanatory ambitions.  Normatively, 
since these presumptive-injunction authorities are well established,
perhaps they embody principles which Justifying Intellectual Property did 
not adequately consider.  Yet assume that Merges had justified Chief 
Justice Roberts’s approach in eBay.  That approach supports construing
59. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908). 
60. Id. at 423–24. 
61. Id. 
62. MERGES, supra note *, at 3. 
63. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
64. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
65. In philosophical jargon, a consilient explanation is preferable to an explanation
that is not consilient, and Merges’s explanation is not consilient if it cannot explain the 
presumptive-injunction principles recounted in this Part. See  JULES L. COLEMAN, THE 
























a patent as the Continental Paper Bag case does—as a “complete
monopoly.”66  I suspect that construction would have reinforced the
suspicions of P skeptics that property concepts are inapplicable to and 
pernicious in IP.  In any case, because the issue litigated in eBay is so
important and accessible, if Justifying Intellectual Property cannot
account for important aspects of that doctrine, I worry that readers may
dismiss the book out of hand.
IV. FOUNDATIONS: LABOR THEORY 
As I stated in the introduction, I believe that Merges’s general 
approach is extremely insightful if it is qualified in a few ways.  In the 
rest of this Article, I will suggest how I would amend that general 
approach to deal with the objections I lodged in the last Part.  I will 
reconsider the issues raised by eBay, working from the bottom layer of 
Merges’s cake up to the icing.  Following Merges, I will start with
foundations, consider a range of midlevel principles that might be 
edifying, and close by focusing on the practice of remedies in patent 
infringement.  In this Part, I begin by explaining why Merges’s account 
of labor theory is so rich and insightful.67 
Merges is absolutely right to suggest that labor theory can ground IP 
rights in patents.  Locke argued that people have within themselves “the 
great Foundation of Property . . . by being . . . Proprietor[s] of [their]
own Person[s], and the Actions or Labour of” those persons.68  This  
labor, Locke argued, “made up the great part of what [man] applyed to 
the Support or Comfort of his being.”69  Although “[m]en, at first, for the
most part, contented themselves with what un-assisted Nature offered to 
their Necessities,”70 some greatly expanded the range of “things really
useful to the Life of Man” by discovering and then applying “Invention 
and Arts.”71  Such invention and practical arts constitute labor— 
intellectual labor.  Iron, wood, leather, bark, stone, clay, coal, and lime
may contribute modestly to man’s survival in a world of “un-assisted
nature,” but when a group of people have the collective know-how to
assemble those materials into a sailing vessel, they increase the intrinsic
66. Cont’l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 423. 
67. By focusing on his treatment of Locke, I do not mean to denigrate Merges’s 
treatments of Kant or Rawls.  We only need one foundation to suffice in order to explore 
the relevant midlevel principles, and I happen to know Lockean labor theory best. 
68. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, § 44, at 298 (Peter Laslett 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
69. Id. at 299. 
70. Id. § 45, at 299. 
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value of the raw materials to the life of man by a metaphorical factor of 
1,000.72 
To be sure, the know-how that goes into making a ship could be 
disseminated as common social knowledge—part of the public domain. 
Yet when a discoverer discovers an invention or practical art not already
in that domain, she may justifiably claim property in it if she satisfies all
the moral criteria associated with labor.  The Supreme Court assumed as
much in Continental Paper Bag.  Quoting from United States v. American 
Bell Telegraph Co., the Court considered an argument whereby 
one who has made an invention and thereupon applies for a patent therefor occupies, 
as it were, the position of a quasi-trustee for the public; that he is under a sort of
moral obligation to see that the public acquires the right to the free use of that
invention as soon as is conveniently possible.  We dissent entirely from the thought 
thus urged.  The inventor is one who has discovered something of value.  It is 
his absolute property.  He may withhold a knowledge of it from the public, and
he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute promises to
him who discloses to the public his invention.73 
IP scholars resist this line of thought for many reasons, most of which I 
cannot recount here.74  Let me take just one common response: Labor
cannot make the sense I just asserted because labor includes worthless 
“sweat of the brow.”  If labor includes sweat of the brow and it seems
silly to award IP in low-grade activities like compiling names into a 
phone directory, then labor theory fails to supply a helpful theory of IP.75 
When understood charitably, however, labor means not mere effort but 
“rational (or purposeful), value-creating activity.  Labor is not any
exercise of energy on objects in the world—acts of destruction or mere
amusement certainly do not qualify—but those actions directed towards 
the preservation or comfort of our being.”76 
72. See id. § 43, at 298. 
73. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (quoting 
United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897)).
74. For a compilation of many such criticisms, see Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying 
Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989). 
75. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–54, 362 
(1991) (rejecting the “sweat of the brow” doctrine as “ha[ving] numerous flaws, the most
glaring being that it extended copyright protection in a compilation beyond selection and
arrangement—the compiler’s original contributions—to the facts themselves” and holding
that copyright protection does not extend to a telephone number listing not selected or 
arranged in any original way).
76. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO 
HUME 151 (1991). 
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One of Merges’s great accomplishments is to start the project of 
reteaching labor theory to IP scholars.77  As Merges puts it, morally 
legitimate labor is the “application of labor to unowned resources for 
highly practical purposes—survival, or more generally, human
flourishing.”78  Thus, an engineer contributes greatly toward the
preservation or comfort of his and others’ beings by developing a 
blueprint for building a new and reliable sailing ship.  The ship expands 
passengers’ freedom to travel and customers’ access to goods imported
by the ship.  There is a small amount of moral worth in assembling
names and phone numbers into a directory.  There is none in rediscovering 
the basic idea of a phone directory when that idea has already been in 
common circulation for a century or more. 
Because the justification for labor inherently limits its scope, labor
claims are qualified by several limiting conditions.  These conditions 
remain to be elaborated even after Justifying Intellectual Property; let
me briefly sketch them here.  First, as already described, one does not 
“labor” justifiably by discovering an intellectual work unless the work
generates “things really useful to the Life of Man.”79  Second, as a
corollary to that first principle, one does not perform intellectual labor 
by reinventing the wheel; intellectual labor deserves proprietary
protection only if it “does not lessen but increase the common stock of 
mankind.”80  In IP, inventive effort does not justify a claim of property 
rights unless the effort expands the useful intellectual resources available
to the community.
Finally, intellectual labor must be performed in such a manner that it 
declares the laborer’s claim of property.  IP scholars often mistakenly
assume that the “property” category enables an owner unilaterally to 
impose a dominant relation over the owned thing to the exclusion of the 
rest of the world.  This view comes out when P skeptics intone
ominously about the “absolutist” or “Blackstonian” character of the 
property category.81  When labor theory is understood charitably, it does
not portray property as a despotic unilateral relation.  In social practice, 
property is a social relation, and labor theory justifies it as a social
77. Similar work is being done by Adam Mossoff.  See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Saving 
Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y, July 2012, at 283. 
78. MERGES, supra note *, at 47. 
79. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 46, at 299. 
80. Id. § 37, at 294. 
81. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, 
REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 36, 38 (“Indeed, the various modes of intellectual property
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relation.  Because all people stand naturally in a “State . . . of Equality, 
wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal,”82 all the members 
of a common political community have equal moral rights to appropriate 
unowned things in the community’s stock, each “to make use of [them] 
to the best advantage of Life, and convenience.”83  The worth of labor 
and human equality create two different prescriptions.  When a person
annexes a thing with labor, the labor “excludes the common right of 
other Men” and “put[s] a distinction between [the thing] and common.”84 
By the same token, the person must “labor” in a manner that other 
members of the community can understand as appropriating the resources
being labored on.  If one farms a field, the farming appropriates it.  If 
one fences the field, the fencing declares an intention to farm soon.
However, if one merely flies over the field, the fly-over is not a clear or
serious enough declaration of intention to appropriate any particular plot 
such that the flyer appropriates the field.85 
In IP, there are two basic ways to satisfy this claim-declaring
requirement.  IP common law deploys the nonconventional route: the 
discoverer keeps his intellectual work secret from everyone else except 
those who have pledged to use it for his chosen ends.86  Alternately, 
legislators may institute conventions declaring intellectual works to be 
distinct property—like patent numbers or the copyright or trademark
symbols.87 
V. MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES I: CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Although labor theory can ground IP rights, Merges is absolutely
correct that the foundations it supplies are two levels removed from the 
practice of IP.88  As Locke puts it, members of a political community
“by Laws within themselves, regulate[] the Properties of the private Men 
of their Society, and so, by Compact and Agreement, settle[] the 
82. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 4, at 269. 
83. Id. § 26, at 286. 
84. Id. §§ 27–28, at 288. 
85. See Claeys, Productive Use in Accession, supra note 17 (manuscript at 38–39). 
86. Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs, supra note 25 (manuscript at 16).  On secrecy at 
common law, see Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663–65 (1834); Donaldson v. 
Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 847; and Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 
201 (K.B.) 230; 4 Burr. 2302, 2356. 
87. Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs, supra note 25 (manuscript at 16). 
88. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
1047



















Property which Labour and Industry began.”89  I wholly agree with 
Merges that midlevel principles play a role in this process of settlement,
implementation, or—my preferred term here—determination;90 
I disagree with him about what the applicable midlevel principles are. 
Let me start with one midlevel principle that is partially relevant to 
eBay—and covered, albeit briefly, by Merges—corrective justice. Merges
attributes the idea of midlevel principles to Jules Coleman.91  According 
to Coleman, “Corrective justice claims that when someone has wronged 
another to whom he owes a duty of care, he thereby incurs a duty of 
repair.”92  For Coleman, corrective justice is a midlevel principle 
because it simultaneously is accessible in and makes sense of the 
practice of tort law.93 
Merges could have said more about corrective justice.  Patent, 
copyright, trademark, trade secret, and hot-news doctrine all appeal to
corrective justice; each institutes a cause of action for—note the terms— 
“infringement” or “misappropriation” of a property interest.  Like the 
more paradigmatic torts that interest Coleman, all of these torts presume
that IP owners stand in normative social relations to nonowners.  When 
nonowners use, copy, disclose, or otherwise infringe on owners’ 
legitimate decisional authority over the IP in dispute, they inflict wrongs 
on the owners.  Corrective justice works in IP, as elsewhere throughout
private law, to impose a duty on nonowners to repair their wrongs to the 
owners’ rights. 
Corrective justice reinforces the same reparative relations in remedies 
law—the issues litigated in eBay.94  Assume MercExchange’s patent
rights entitled it to decide whether, at what price, and on what conditions 
to alienate the use of its patented invention.  If so, equity accomplishes 
corrective justice by enjoining eBay from taking the property
MercExchange enjoys in these rights of use and disposition.  Assume,
however, that MercExchange’s property in its patents does not entitle it 
to make such decisions given eBay’s sunk costs in its website.  In that
scenario, MercExchange still suffered a wrong by eBay’s having 
infringed its patents.  Yet an injunction would supply MercExchange not 
only with repair but also with a windfall.  Corrective justice would then
89. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 45, at 299. 
90. MERGES, supra note *, at 139–43. 
91. See id. at 139–40 (quoting COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 5–6, 54–55). 
92. COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 32.  Philosophical scholars of torts quibble about 
the precise meaning and content of corrective justice; I disregard these debates and assume
that Coleman’s definition is good enough here. 
93. See id. at 54–55. 
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entitle MercExchange only to compensation from eBay for the patent
rights it wrongly took.95 
All the same, Merges was right not to dwell overlong on corrective 
justice.  Corrective justice is not the only midlevel principle at work in a
dispute like Continental Paper Bag or eBay—and it is probably not the
most important principle.  As Coleman explains: 
[C]orrective justice is an account of the second-order duty of repair.  Someone
does not incur a second-order duty of repair unless he has failed to discharge 
some first-order duty.  However, the relevant first-order duties are not themselves
duties of corrective justice.  Thus, while corrective justice presupposes some account 
of what the relevant first-order duties are, it does not pretend to provide an account
of them.96 
To a practicing lawyer, the policy issue raised in eBay presents a
“first-order” question of property law and policy.  What rights of 
disposition and commercialization does a patent holder deserve as part 
of the property he enjoys in the patent?  Once property law supplies an
answer to that question, the law of remedies can implement the answer, 
in the course of imposing a “second-order” duty of repair.  Because the 
corrective duty is logically subsidiary to the first-order prescriptions 
from property law and policy, however, I thought Merges was gonna 
want more property.
VI. MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES II: JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY’S CANDIDATES
A.  Nonremoval 
Justifying Intellectual Property supplies as one midlevel property 
principle, the “nonremoval principle.”97  Nonremoval is cumbersome 
shorthand for a norm that information belonging in the public domain
should not be removed from the public domain.  As Merges notices, 
“[n]ot all information can be protected with IP rights,” for copyright
excludes factual information, patent excludes math formulas and laws of 
nature, and trademark law excludes generic words or phrases.98  As  
Merges also observes, “Other legal rules limit the duration of IP 
95. I explain the general relation between corrective justice and the law of remedies 
using trade secrecy in Claeys, Private Law Theory, supra note 25, at 24–27, 57–59. 
96. COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 32. 
97. MERGES, supra note *, at 141–42. 












    
  
 














      
   
rights.”99  Copyrights and patents are subject to statutory term limits,100 
and trade secrets have built-in duration limits keyed to the length of time 
it would take a reasonably competent competitor to discover the 
substance of the secret independently.101  And Merges describes IP 
insightfully when he speaks of the “implicit zone of expansion surrounding 
all freely available works.”102  This zone is embodied in the “originality”
requirement for copyright; the “novelty,” “prior art,” and “nonobviousness”
doctrines in patent;103 and trade secrecy’s requirement that a secret be
minimally novel or nonascertainable.104  Taking all of these legal 
requirements together, Merges concludes that the nonremoval principle 
aims “to prevent appropriation of that which is already possessed by
people working in a field.”105 
Here, I think Merges has identified a valid midlevel principle relevant
to IP.  I suspect nonremovability could be justified on several different
overlapping foundations.  Although I cannot cover all the possible 
foundations here, let me explain why labor theory justifies nonremovability.
Contrary to P skeptics, neither Lockean labor theory nor property law 
is designed to institute a monopoly over every external asset that could 
conceivably be owned.106  Locke himself assumed that the ocean was 
and should remain “that great and still remaining Common of Mankind.”107 
The ocean lends itself to common uses—as a pool for fishing and a 
public way for navigation.  Thus, in the case of the ocean, common-property 
treatment encourages free and concurrent labor more effectively than
privatization would.
Similarly, in the realm of IP, the law secures and encourages 
concurrent labor by equal citizens when it prevents the propertization of 
information already commonly available.  Private property secures and 
encourages labor only when individuals discover and create intellectual
works not already commonly known. That insight generates a general
carve-out running throughout the IP law for intellectual works108: 
99. Id. 
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
101. See Research Equip. Co. v. Galloway, 485 S.W.2d 953, 956–57 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1972). 
 102. MERGES, supra note *, at 142. 
103. Id. at 142–43. 
104. See, e.g., Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying a 
novelty requirement in trade secrecy); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 
1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (requiring that a trade secret “not be[] readily ascertainable
by proper means”). 
 105. MERGES, supra note *, at 143. 
106. See supra Part IV, notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 107. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 30, at 289.
108. Here, the law of “intellectual works” focuses on patent, copyright, trade secrecy,
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creators cannot claim property in works already in common knowledge. 
In a similar spirit, when a math formula helps facilitate a myriad 
different particular practical applications but does not automatically lead 
to any one of those applications, better that patent law keep the formula 
out of IP and make property available only for the application109—the
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”110  So too  
with facts in relation to works of authorship. 
With only slight modifications, one can also induce from Merges’s 
nonremoval principle the “implicit zone of expansion” requirement and 
a duration requirement for intellectual works.  Both of these requirements 
embody labor theory’s requirement that information “not lessen but
increase the common stock of mankind.”111  The implicit zone of
expansion limits IP rights on the front end, so that a work is propertized
only after the laborer creates or discovers it.  The duration requirement 
limits the property on the back end, so that the owner ceases to hold 
property after it is reasonably likely that many individuals will have
developed rough substitutes for the work.  When many such substitutes 
are reasonably likely to have been created or discovered, the work is 
likely to percolate throughout the society and become part of the public 
domain.  At that moment, the justification for private property again 
112ceases. 
Nevertheless, although the nonremoval principle is important in IP 
practice, it is not relevant to the remedy issue raised in eBay.113  Because
that issue focuses on remedies, we must assume that MercExchange had 
a valid patent and that the patent had been infringed.  By assumption, the
invention at issue did not belong in the public domain by operation of
nonremoval or any specific elaboration of that norm.  Can any other 
midlevel principle connect labor foundations to the relevant remedy
questions?  Here, I could have used a little more property. 
intellectual works excludes trademarks because for a trademark, the property lies not in 
the exclusive use of an idea created but rather a symbol associated with a good or service
in commerce. 
109. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972). 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 111. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 37, at 294.
112. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 182 (1974). 





















       
    
B.  Efficiency 
Merges’s second midlevel principle is efficiency—“getting things 
done as cheaply as possible.”114  This principle is the least satisfying of 
Merges’s proposed principles, for reasons explained by Jules Coleman.
Coleman argues that economic efficiency is not an appropriate principle 
for explaining the internal content or structure of tort law.115  Because 
Merges relies heavily on Coleman’s conception of midlevel principles,116 
if Merges means to argue that efficiency counts as such a principle, it is
reasonable to expect him to consider and explain away Coleman’s 
arguments why economic efficiency cannot satisfy the criteria for such 
principles. 
Although I cannot restate or elaborate on Coleman’s critique at length,
let me at least restate the basic problems and illustrate how they might 
apply in IP.117  First, economic analysis is reductive because it purports
to explain private law in abstracting from the normative claims about
value and rights that are central to private law.118  If patent law is “really
all about” labor, autonomy, or some other criterion of justice “at the 
deepest level,”119 economic analysis is unsatisfying to the extent it
avoids those criteria.
Next, because economic efficiency states a social goal, it cannot 
explain the normative structure of private lawsuits.  Such lawsuits focus 
on the rights-claims of individuals.  They are bilateral, to tie a victim to 
the tortfeasor who wronged her.120  For example, in eBay, the infringement 
suit was structured to make central the fact that eBay had wronged the
rights MercExchange deserved to the exclusive use of its patents.121  If 
patent law were a means to promote efficient investment, it could 
dispense with the “rights” and “wrongs” talk and promote efficiency
differently, by subsidizing innovation with public money or by
administrative processes.   
Last, assume that a certain balancing of equities in remedies disputes
happens to encourage efficient levels of investment into invention, but
also that competitors judge the patent system by how well it rewards 
 114. MERGES, supra note *, at 151. 
 115. COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 11–24. 
116. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
117. I have developed this critique at greater length in relation to economic analyses 
of trade secrecy in Claeys, Private Law Theory, supra note 25, at 17–20. 
118. See COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 23. 
 119. MERGES, supra note *, at 3. 
120. See COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 13–21.  Or, an alleged victim, an alleged 
tortfeasor, and an alleged wrong. 
121. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E.D. Va. 2003),
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their labor and secures their rights.  Economic analysis cannot explain 
what motivates IP stakeholders and regulators to follow rules that are
coincidentally efficient—at least, not without arguing that the parties are 
all in the grip of a rights-based “ideological illusion.”122 
Justifying Intellectual Property does not consider these criticisms of
efficiency.  Until such objections are considered thoroughly, I doubt
efficiency can qualify as a midlevel principle.  Here, Merges and other 
rights-based theorists are gonna want more property on their track. 
C.  Dignity and Proportionality
Merges’s last two principles are proportionality—discussed at length 
in relation to eBay—and dignity.123  I suspect these principles are too 
indeterminate to serve the functions one would expect of midlevel 
principles.  I have many doubts; let me voice just two.  Each of the terms 
seems indeterminate on its own.  Stated abstractly, what is MercExchange
entitled to as a matter of “dignity”?  If MercExchange’s patent rights 
should be limited in proportion to their merits, what factors inform the 
merits and shape the “proportions”? 
Separately, as they inform law, I suspect that dignity and proportionality 
are better understood as conclusions, not analytical tools.  Take eBay
again.  Assume that MercExchange seems entitled to an injunction,
notwithstanding that the injunction may inflict severe hardship on eBay. 
One way of describing that situation is to say that MercExchange’s
dignity entitles it to an injunction irrespective of the consequences to
eBay.  Now assume that the hardships to eBay or the public seem severe 
enough that MercExchange is not entitled to the injunction.  That
situation could be described by saying that the injunction is a remedy
disproportionate to the affront to MercExchange’s dignity.  Both 
descriptions beg crucial questions about why labor, or some other 
similar foundation, gives a patentee dignity in the exclusive commercial 
use of its invention in some situations but not others.  And to settle those 
questions, I have a fever, and the only cure is more property.
 122. COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 25; see also id. at 25–29.  For an eBay-related work 
embodying all the instrumentalist tendencies I criticize in this section, see Ted M. 
Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-077, 2011), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1932834, which proposes to recast patent remedy law to focus primarily
on promoting efficient innovation within a public law framework. 



























VII. MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES III: MORE PROPERTY 
As substitutes for dignity and proportionality, I propose more midlevel
property principles.  Different IP problems may raise different principles;
I offer here three that seem especially relevant to the remedy questions
raised by eBay. 
First is the principle of accession.124  Accession problems arise when 
an existing object of property generates goods that may or may not be
classified as part of the original object—for example, when a cow
delivers a calf.  Such problems also arise when two existing objects are
merged into a new entity—such as when copper and tin ingots are fused 
into bronze ingots.  Merges’s bridge example presents an accession 
problem.125  Before the bridge was built, Al and the builders had separate
assets—respectively, land and bridge materials.  After construction, as a
matter of fact, the land and materials are fused.  Legally, a judge might
hold that Al owned the bridge—as a fixture and accessory to the land. 
Alternatively, if the judge decided that the bridge builders deserved to 
keep the bridge and acquire the land, the judge would be holding that the 
land had become an accessory to the bridge.  Although different doctrines 
treat accession differently depending on context, at the level of policy,
accession focuses on: (1) whether the objects at issue are more likely to 
be used productively as separate entities or as a single package entity;
and (2) whether observers are likely to perceive the objects as one 
“thing” or multiple “things.”126 
The other two principles state two rival paradigms; I call them here 
“use rights” and “control rights.”  Use rights are shorthand for legal
usufructs, while control rights are shorthand for legal rights of exclusive 
control, use, possession, and disposition.  As a paradigm, a usufruct is a 
legal entitlement to appropriate an asset for ongoing uses.127  A usufruct
lasts only as long as the ongoing uses, and it does not entitle the user to
veto, blockade, or otherwise exclude others from using the asset for their
own beneficial uses comparable to the user’s uses.128  Oversimplified 
slightly, control rights make all the changes needed to a “user’s”
property rights to make that user an “owner.”  An owner with control 
124. See Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 56 VILL.
L. REV. 251, 259–88 (2011).  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original 
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2010), available at http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
content/1/2/459.full.pdf. 
125. See MERGES, supra note *, at 162–65. 
126. See Claeys, Productive Use in Accession, supra note 17 (manuscript at 30–32). 
127. See Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1). 
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rights may blockade others from engaging with the asset without her
consent, even if they are presently using it beneficially and she is not.129 
Property law makes both use rights and control rights available 
because each advances property policies in different situations.  Because
I am assuming labor foundations here, let me explain in terms of those 
foundations.  In labor theory, all property rights are justified in relation
to moral use rights.  If every denizen of the world has “reason to make
use of [the world] to the best advantage of Life, and convenience,”130 in 
strict principle no one can have “any Property . . . exclusive of all the 
rest of” mankind.131  And, in many situations, legal use rights effectively 
and appropriately secure to community members their moral use rights.
Locke suggests examples in the Two Treatises: in aboriginal communities,
in which there is little specialized use of property, each member deserves 
the right to consume whatever fruits, nuts, or animals he catches and to 
drink as much water as he stores.132  However, for many resources, 
control rights may help owners labor to produce far more goods beneficial 
to human flourishing.  Locke illustrates with farms, ranches, and the
sailing ship already mentioned.133  Oversimplified slightly, control rights
make sense when several of a cluster of factors apply: whether it takes
long and expensive investment to extract benefit from the asset; whether 
the asset can be put to a variety of specialized uses; and whether the
asset’s value is best extracted when coordinated with labor and other 
assets.
IP law deploys both control rights and use rights.  The simplest way to
illustrate is to contrast trade secrecy with patent law.  A trade secret 
entitles its holder to use rights over the secret.  On one hand, the holder
enjoys the exclusive use of the secret for as long as it remains secret and 
not ascertained by others.134  When grounded in labor theory, the
entitlement to secrecy and exclusive use protects the labor the discoverer
expended to discover the intellectual work underlying the secret and to
reduce it to practical use.  On the other hand, the owner of a trade secret 
cannot stop others from using the secret, not if they discover or reverse 
engineer the secret’s intellectual substance honestly, without stealing, 
129. See id. (manuscript at 4–8). 
 130. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 26, at 286.
131. Id. § 25, at 286. 
132. Id. §§ 28–31, at 288–90. 
133. Id. §§ 38, 43–48, at 295–96, 298–301. 
134. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
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bribing, or eavesdropping to acquire its substance.135  These qualifications 
embody and protect the labor interests of competitors, who have equal 
rights to labor to discover and to make “enough[] and as good”136 use of
that intellectual substance for their own ends.137 
By contrast, patent law entitles a patentee to the exclusive use of the 
patented invention, by entitling him to an action against anyone who 
“uses, offers to sell, or sells” the invention while it is under patent.138 
Chancellor James Kent described patent law as granting control rights— 
not the “exclusive enjoyment” (or use rights) associated with trade 
secrets but rather “the right to the exclusive use and profit of . . .
productions and discoveries.”139  And he justified patent in relation to
labor on the ground that “[i]t is just that [inventors] should enjoy the
pecuniary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily labour.”140 
Now, neither Kent, nor Merges, nor any other source of which I am 
aware has explained specifically how labor foundations can justify rights 
like patent’s control rights.  The suggestion that labor theory can supply 
such a justification is quite controversial, and will remain so even after 
Justifying Intellectual Property.141  Let me outline the justification, 
understanding that it needs to be elaborated and specified considerably 
elsewhere.
If an intellectual work makes a substantial advance over the existing
prior art, the law may secure and enlarge the labor interests of all 
interested parties paradoxically, by giving the inventor a temporary right 
to exclude others from using it in any manner without her consent. 
Obviously, this monopoly uses (in Kent’s words) “the hope of profit” to
encourage inventors to engage in research and development that might 
135. See Hammock v. Hoffmann-Laroche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 560 (N.J. 1995). 
 136. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 27, at 288.
137. See Claeys, Private Law Theory, supra note 25, at 32–34; Claeys, Intellectual
Usufructs, supra note 25 (manuscript at 10–18). 
138. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 139. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 298–99 (1827); see also
Claeys, Intellectual Usufructs, supra note 25, at 20 (explaining Kent’s analysis of trade 
secret versus patent protection). 
 140. 2 KENT, supra note 139, at 299. 
141. For scholarly works resisting this suggestion root and branch, see Tom W.
Bell, Indelicate Balancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne 
Crews eds., 2002); Hettinger, supra note 74; and Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and 
Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in
COPY FIGHTS, supra, at 43. For scholarly works suggesting that labor principles require 
conventional property rights considerably weaker than provided in current patent law, 
see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); and Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS 
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seem unjustifiable if trade secrets were IP’s only way to protect practical
inventions.142  When intellectual laborers invent inventions that would 
not be discovered but for the patent system, the products that follow 
from the inventions increase the opportunities for consumers to labor. 
Of course, because all citizens have equal rights to labor, patent law
must respect the labor-based interests of competitors in conducting their
own research and development.  Yet if the invention leaps far enough 
beyond the prior art, it is practically unlikely that any competitor would 
have discovered the invention during the patent’s term anyway.  In 
addition, the patent system requires patentees to file a patent application 
and accompanying specifications or drawings,143 all of which are 
publicly available.  By expanding the technical knowledge available to 
competitors, the patent system widens their opportunities to experiment, 
research, develop—and labor productively.144 
The accession principle and the choice between use and control rights
are much more specific than Merges’s principles for efficiency, 
proportionality, and dignity.  Why do I prefer that my principles be so 
specific?  I admit, I am not certain whether Merges’s principles violate
or whether my principles satisfy whatever criteria Coleman had in mind
when he used the words midlevel and principle to explain the role of 
corrective justice.145  In any case, the notion of a midlevel principle is a 
heuristic device and should be judged by how well it clarifies and
justifies law as it is practiced by participants in the IP system.  The
principles I have identified are certainly apparent in the practice of IP
and the law of real property.  In addition, in my opinion, my principles 
strike the right balance of generality and specificity to count as midlevel
principles. Since labor—or autonomy or fairness—already supplies an
adequate guiding norm for IP, I doubt that efficiency, proportionality, or 
dignity help focus or implement IP’s foundations.  Tort and remedies 
can invoke a single unifying principle, corrective justice.  Yet they may
do so primarily because their content is parasitic on norms coming from
property or other substantive, rights-declaring fields of law. 
By contrast, in fields like property, I suspect midlevel principles are 
most often paradigms or working principles, which take a first cut at 
 142. 2 KENT, supra note 139, at 299. 
143. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111–113 (2006). 
144. Cf. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) 
(discussing the benefit to the public of an inventor disclosing an invention to gain a patent). 


















implementing the general prescriptions that come from the field’s 
foundational normative commitments.  Locke gets at this relation by
speaking of “an establish’d, settled, known Law, received and allowed
by common consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong.”146 
Merges’s nonremovability principle nicely illustrates the level of 
generality at which a midlevel principle operates in property law.  The 
general principle it states generates four more specific doctrinal 
concepts, each of which recurs in trade secrecy, copyright, and patent. 
Accession and the choice between control and use rights capture the
same combination of generality and specificity.  Accession issues run 
throughout specific property doctrines, and the choice between control
and use rights matters hugely in structuring IP torts for infringement or 
misappropriation, affirmative defenses, and the scope of equitable relief.
The accession principle and the control-rights and use-rights paradigms
come with standard eligibility criteria, which determine whether their
categories apply.  When they apply, they generate legal forms—legal
presumptions, which may be refined further or made rebuttable.  Yet 
even as these principles and paradigms institute formal rules, lawmakers 
and citizens judge the forms teleologically, by the extent to which 
“established laws of liberty . . . secure protection and incouragement to 
the honest industry of Mankind.”147 
VIII. EBAY RECONSIDERED (WHILE REALLY EXPLORING 
THE SPACE OF PROPERTY CONCEPTS) 
The accession principle and the justification for control rights just 
sketched certainly do not determine or settle the eBay question in any 
definitive way.  But these two principles do help focus the law on the 
policy questions that most lawyers would intuit to be the relevant
questions.
On one hand, both the accession principle and the control and use 
paradigms ground Merges’s arguments for the no-presumption rule for 
which Justice Kennedy and Merges both argue.  As a matter of labor-
based accession policy, when a person owns a plot of riparian land, the 
law should secure his rights to labor on that land—but not the right to 
extract value attributable to assembly on property beyond that land. 
The contrast between the control and use paradigms homes in on the 
same problem.  Many prominent property rights are hybrids; they endow 
owners with broad rights of control qualified to leave nonowners with a 
few uses that are valuable to nonowners and not threatening to owners.
 146. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 124, at 351. 
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Although real property law generally structures land rights to preserve to 
owners exclusive control, it allows exceptions that entitle nonowners to
use or access land in ways that encourage their beneficial labor without
undermining owner control.  On that basis, the prima facie case for
trespass to land makes any unconsented entry a trespass, but defenses
may then excuse roaming cattle, grazing rights,148 or airplane overflights.149 
In IP, copyright and patent infringement are both defined in fairly hard-
edged, trespassory terms,150 but copyright excuses fair uses,151 and the
federal patent statutes have been read to excuse experimental uses.152 
The limitations on equitable relief recounted in Parts II and III 
implement a similar hybrid strategy.  Assume property law employs 
control rights over an asset, that a title owner is not using that asset, and
that a nonowner is using the asset in a way that commingles the asset
with the nonowner’s own meritorious labor.  Under the right conditions,
the law enlarges the labor interests of all owners by denying to them the 
right to enjoin encroachments or infringements in such cases.153  Given 
such conditions, each owner stands to have more labor protected in cases 
in which he is a mistaken high-value encroacher or infringer on someone
else’s asset than he stands to lose from being required to suffer a
permanent encroachment or infringement on his own asset.
On the other hand, the accession principle and the control and use
paradigms require public officials to consider two countervailing 
problems.  One is that the very notions of “property” and “control” 
entitle owners to substantial latitude in determining whether to use 
something, how to do so, or in what conditions to alienate their things. 
Again, control rights are justified for land, works of authorship, and
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504 (1977). 
149. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). 
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (establishing the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner); id. § 501 (defining copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (defining
patent infringement). 
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
152. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Sawin v.
Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 
F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (“[I]t could never have been the 
intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed . . . a machine merely for 
philosophical experiments . . . .”).
153. See Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable Decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597, 613 (2010) (“[T]he [Supreme] 
Court generally has recognized that district courts retain the discretion to deny injunctions in





















   
 
     
    
  




patented inventions largely because people have the greatest incentive 
and capacity to labor productively on these assets when one “owner” 
enjoys near total control to invest in them, specialize uses of them,
coordinate uses of them, or dispose of them commercially.  By
definition, ordinarily, owners of such assets are better situated than 
nonowners to know such assets’ highest and best uses—at least, for
those owners’ particular life plans.  In Locke’s epistemology, human
knowledge is limited by “Men being biassed by their Interest” and by
many other complications.154  “Rights” acknowledge and accommodate
these limitations; if each person is a worse judge of others’ interests than
her own, then all people deserve individually the greatest rights
practicable “to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and
Persons as they think fit.”155  In legal practice, then, property law should
institute a robust presumption in favor of an owner’s retaining control 
over the use and disposition of his asset.  What nonowners perceive to be 
nonuses or low value uses may in reality be productive uses; the 
nonowners may undervalue owner uses because they are biased by their 
desire to own or use the owner’s property.  This possibility is one of
several reasons justifying the presumption, in real property remedial law,
that “one who wants a particular estate for a specific use, if deprived of 
his rights, cannot be said to receive an exact equivalent or complete 
indemnity by the payment of a sum of money.”156 
This presumption makes considerable sense in patent law as well.  In 
the Continental Paper Bag case, the Court distinguished between mere
nonuse and nonuse “only explainable upon the hypothesis of a purpose 
to abnormally force trade into unnatural channels.”157  The latter might
disentitle a patentee from getting an injunction as a matter of course, but 
mere nonuse would not because “[t]here are many reasons for non-use 
which, upon explanation, are cogent.”158 Ordinarily, control rights
entitle owners to decide how to use assets—and to what personal values 
they wish to subordinate those uses.  On that basic principle, ordinarily, 
the law should strongly discourage legal second-guessing of what seems 
 154. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 124, at 351. 
155. Id. § 4, at 269.  Here, labor theory and midlevel property principles
implementing it embody a principle comparable to economic notions of owner subjective 
value.  See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091–93 (1997); Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement 
as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 93 (2009). 
156. Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726, 727–28 (Mass. 1935) (quoting 
Lynch v. Union Inst. for Sav., 34 N.E. 364, 364–65 (Mass. 1893)). 
157. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 427 (1908) (quoting 
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 745 (1st Cir. 1906) (Aldrich, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 210 U.S. 405). 
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to be nonuse.  Here, the Continental Paper Bag Court appreciated
insights lost on the district court in eBay.  When the district court 
believed that MercExchange did not deserve equitable relief, it cited “the
evidence of the plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents, its lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents,” the fact that “the plaintiff 
exists solely to license its patents or sue to enforce its patents,” and the
court’s own belief that money damages supplied an adequate remedy.159 
Yet an owner uses an asset beneficially if he gives the asset to someone
who needs it, and in a community with a market economy he uses it just 
as effectively by trading it for money or some other medium of value.160 
According to labor theory and Continental Paper Bag’s conceptions of 
property and use, MercExchange’s licensing constituted beneficial use. 
And the district court erred again when it assumed that it could guess the
right dollar value for MercExchange’s lost license royalties.161  The  
district court also denied injunctive relief because it thought it would be 
too time-consuming and fractious to supervise a continuing injunction.162 
Yet all the factors that would have made a continuing injunction 
unmanageable would have made a license valuation proceeding worse.
Separately, the accession principle and the control and use paradigms
focus attention on another issue—the relation between property rights 
and socialization.  Labor theory distinguishes between “the use of the 
Industrious and Rational” and “the Fancy or Covetousness of the 
Quarrelsom and Contentious.”163  When A improves for human benefit a
thing “already improved by [B’s] Labour,” A’s work counts not as labor 
but rather as conduct motivated by a “desire[ for] the benefit of another’s
Pains.”164  The equitable principles recounted in Part III institute this
distinction in remedy doctrine.165  Accession principles bring this
principle into focus.  It may be just to treat B’s tin as an accessory to the 
bronze A made from A’s copper and A’s labor—but not if A converted
159. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712–14 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 160. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 46, at 300 (“If he gave away a part to any body
else, so that it perished not uselesly in his Possession, these he also made use of.”). 
161. See MercExchange, L.L.C., 275 F. Supp. 2d at 713. 
162. See id. at 714.  For an analysis of Continental Paper Bag much more skeptical
than the one offered in text, see Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not To 
Use in Property and Patent Law (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 12-62, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2162667. 
 163. LOCKE, supra note 68, bk. II, § 34, at 291. 
164. Id.

























B’s tin deliberately.  In the latter case, if the law limits B’s remedy to
damages only, it rewards A for disregarding B’s particular plans for his
tin and for gambling that he could pay B money damages and pocket the 
profit left over after the damage payment.166  Remedy doctrine is also
informed by the control-versus-use paradigm.167  Property law allows
rights of access in situations in which nonowners are likely to enter
owners’ land in ways that do not threaten owners’ core uses or manifest 
an intent to trespass.  But if a nonowner’s trespass is deliberate or
severe, a state-sanctioned use right socializes citizens to wonder whether 
trespassing and paying damages “is not more profitable than obeying the 
law.”168 
These considerations do not automatically make compelling or 
conclusive the approach favored in Continental Paper Bag and by Chief 
Justice Roberts in eBay.  But they do make that approach seem much 
more legitimate and practical.  The considerations entitle patentees to 
some presumption in favor of injunctive relief.  Even if a patentee is not 
using a patent in an active and immediate sense in a particular case, 
these considerations supply indirect consequentialist reasons why the
patentee might deserve an injunction anyway.  Permanent-damage
valuation proceedings may not value patentees’ likely future uses
accurately; they may instead discourage private licensing in competitive 
markets.
This process of presumption, rebuttal, and refinement illustrates how 
foundations and midlevel principles inform the specifics of legal 
practice.  Neither labor theory nor the relevant midlevel principles 
require a specific result.  Yet they do strengthen considerably the case
for one general range of results.  They supply working presumptions on
which public decisionmakers may rely to narrow and focus their 
decisions in practice.  At the same time, labor foundations and the 
relevant principles also leave considerable room for legislators and
judges to disagree about important subsidiary doctrinal questions not
settled by the presumptions. 
For example, there must be some line where really egregious nonuse 
disentitles a patentee from recovering equitable relief for infringement.
Should that line be drawn broadly at any “mere” licensing, at the lack of
any licensing or use, or, most narrowly, only at nonuse motivated by 
166. See 2 KENT, supra note 139, at 296–97. 
167. See Newman, supra note 124, at 90–93. 
168. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 161 (Wis. 1997).  In
Jacque, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin awarded not injunctive relief but punitive damages 
for a harmless but deliberate trespass.  Id.  Yet the rationale for punitive damages is identical
to the rationale for imposing injunctive relief whenever a trespass is deliberate or accidental
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intent to monopolize a market?  Labor foundations and the relevant 
midlevel principles point toward the middle or—especially—the last
choice, but public decisionmakers may reasonably consider all three
options in light of the available concrete evidence. 
Separately, how much of an economic impact must an injunction have 
on the noninfringing parts of an infringer’s assembly before the balance
of hardships becomes inequitable to the infringer?  Labor foundations 
and the relevant midlevel principles require that the ratio be stacked in 
favor of the patentee,169 but decisionmakers are left with latitude to settle
the order of magnitude for the ratio: 10:1, 100:1, or 1,000:1.
Finally, how innocent must an infringer be for it to be appropriate to 
refrain from entering an injunction—ignorant of any actual or mistaken
infringement after a duly-diligent search of existing patents?  The 
relevant foundations and midlevel principles make strict liability or 
inquiry notice seem reasonable alternatives.  Yet public officials may
consider alternatives if relevant evidence in practice justifies doing so, 
and they must choose between these two candidates if there is no
relevant evidence for other alternatives.
IX. THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Granted, because it does not settle questions like these, labor-based IP 
remains somewhat indeterminate, even when it is revised and 
supplemented as I have suggested here.  Here, however, no one should
expect any more determinacy from rights-based theory than Merges
promises with his metaphorical three-layer cake.170  There is quite a bit 
of play in the move from foundations to midlevel principles.  There is 
even more in the move from the middle level to practice.  As a result,
labor theory creates a justificatory structure within which public officials 
may disagree reasonably about how to implement general policies in
doctrine. 
Separately, however, the account of equity I have proposed in this and 
the last Part is more satisfying than Merges’s corresponding account. 
Merges can explain one half of a tension in the doctrine—the no-
presumption arguments offered by Justice Kennedy in eBay.171  Yet his
169. See supra notes 68–72, 139–44, and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
















   
 
    
   
 
       
proportionality-based account neither explains nor justifies the other half
of the tension—or why the tension exists. 
In addition, the sketch developed in this and the last Part confirms my
suspicions about Merges’s nonproperty midlevel principles.  One could
describe the relevant equity doctrines on efficiency grounds.  Yet the 
foregoing sketch gets to the same result using moral phraseology. 
Equity orders how competitors exercise their concurrent rights to labor 
in close cases, where the infringer is not very culpable, the connection
between a property holder’s legal property and the labor interest
underlying that interest is attenuated, and the infringer’s labor interest 
seems strong.  “Labor” states a moral interest that appeals to the parties, 
binds them socially, and supplies normative force to doctrine, in terms of
concepts internal to doctrine.  By contrast, like utility, efficiency is 
neither a “serviceable first-order principle of the IP system” nor a 
serviceable second-order principle, at least not without piggybacking on 
labor theory or some other rights-based account of the parties’ legitimate 
rights and normative interests.172 
Separately, dignity and proportionality seem not organizing principles 
but conclusions.  When a decisionmaker thinks it appropriate to protect a 
patentee’s right to control the commercial use of his invention, the 
decisionmaker will speak of “property” in dignity-laden terms—as a 
right to a domain of choice that “cannot be replaced by any sum of 
money, however large.”173  But when the infringer does not act with a
culpable scienter and an injunction threatens to blockade plans involving 
legitimate labor through noninfringing activities, then the injunction 
seems disproportionate to the control the patentee deserves to protect the 
freedom to labor associated with his patent. 
Yet, notwithstanding my criticisms, I hope that the foregoing sketch
illustrates how rich and generative Merges’s general framework is.  My 
differences with Merges pale in comparison with the differences we
share as P essentialists against P skeptics.  For example, Merges’s 
colleague Peter Menell has warned against exporting “Locke’s natural 
rights conception of property” to IP.174  Menell makes two arguments for
this warning, one historical and one normative.  The historical argument 
is that patent and copyright have been shaped by utilitarian imperatives, 
not natural-rights ones; the normative one holds that it would be bad to 
 172. MERGES, supra note *, at 3; see also Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law 
Theory: A Comment on Property As the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 140, 
146–47 (2012) (describing the limits of the economic method for justifying property
rights). 
173. Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726, 727 (Mass. 1935) (quoting Lynch
v. Union Inst. for Sav., 34 N.E. 364, 364 (Mass. 1893)).
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apply property principles to IP because such principles are tethered to
the law of real property and are in that context “absolutist.”175  Menell’s
historical assertions contradict not only Kent’s Commentaries,176 but
also careful historical scholarship to the contrary;177 those assertions
need not be considered at length here.  I hope my friendly criticisms and 
amendments here help scholars appreciate how Justifying Intellectual 
Property responds to Menell’s normative argument, which reflects views 
widely shared by many IP scholars.178 
It is inaccurate to say, as Menell does, that Lockean labor theory 
necessarily requires an “absolutist” account of IP.  One of Merges’s 
great accomplishments is to show, in the context of IP, how Locke’s 
theory of labor “provide[s] both a powerful theory of original acquisition 
of property and a robust set of limitations on that right,” grounded in the
labor claims of nonowners.179  Merges illustrates concretely with claims
by the residents of developing countries on lifesaving drug patents.180 
More generally, Merges also accommodates the normative interests of 
owners and nonowners with a structure in which “core” IP rights 
embody the claims of inventors and authors, and these rights are 
qualified at the “periphery” for components of an intellectual work 
whose value is largely attributable to social factors.181  As the last two 
Parts of this Article suggested, I would conceive of and justify the patent 
“bargain”—and the corresponding bargain for copyright—somewhat 
differently.  Nevertheless, Merges and I both agree that patent and 
copyright property rights are limited by social obligations correlative 
with the foundational rights that justify IP. 
In contrast, Menell cites the experimental use defense and the eBay
case as knock-down proof that property rights are utilitarian and are not
perfectly exclusive.182  Neither doctrine supports Menell’s argument.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
177. See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical 
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 953–57 (2007). 
178. See, e.g., JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 29 (3d ed. 2009) (“Natural rights 
theory does not address the central question of balancing proprietary rights against 
enhancement of the public domain.”). 
 179. MERGES, supra note *, at 273. 
180. See id. at 272–76. 
181. See id. at 121–33. 

























Utilitarian theories are not the only theories that can justify use-based
qualifications on patent’s general control-rights structure.  As the last
two Parts showed, labor theory can justify both the experimental use 
defense and the eBay exception.  Moreover, Menell sets up a straw man
when he assumes that labor-based property rights are perfectly
exclusive.  The prima facie case for patent infringement is exclusive, but 
the substance of patent control rights are hemmed in by defenses,
limitations on equitable relief, and the eligibility criteria for getting a 
patent.183  The defenses and the limitations on equitable relief are not set
in stone, either.  If policymakers or scholars think that patent rights do 
not give enough due to the labor claims of nonpatentees, they may
expand the defenses or constrict the remedies available in infringement
litigation.  More importantly, the rights of exclusive control a patentee 
gets as a matter of law are justified by and limited consistent with a 
moral labor theory in which no person has a moral labor interest higher
than or exclusive of any other person’s concurrent interest. 
By the same token, Merges’s account and mine here clarify the 
problems with another common P-skeptic argument: IP is bad because it
consists of a state-granted monopoly.184  To begin with, the simplest IP 
rights—common law trade secrets—do not create monopolies, for they
embody use rights.  Patents and copyrights do create legal monopolies, 
but by itself that fact is not necessarily bad.185  Land rights are legal
monopolies, too, but no one worries because land is plentiful and most 
lots are fungible.  Equally important, in IP law as justified by labor 
theory, the monopolies are designed to apply only when they advance 
and accord with the labor interests of all the moral stakeholders—
not only IP owners.  The many different applications of Merges’s
nonremovability principle all make control rights inappropriate over 
intellectual works already in or soon to be in the public domain.186 
Patents and copyrights give competitors implicit in-kind compensation
for having restricted their opportunities to labor by requiring the 
disclosure of the intellectual works created.  Both also advance the labor
interests of consumers and competitors by incentivizing IP creators to
create works with which the public and competitors can engage. 
To be sure, in practice, it can be argued that one or many of the
relevant IP doctrines grants too much monopoly.  If Merges and I are 
correct, however, P doctrine provides enough doctrinal vehicles to
183. See supra Part II and notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic 
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729–38 (2000). 
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calibrate the monopoly in IP to the right level.  Justifying Intellectual
Property highlights all the doctrines that regulate the interface between
IP and the public domain.  As this Article has suggested, accession
principles and use-based exceptions serve similar goals.  These and other
similar principles and doctrines adequately let policymakers reconcile 
legal property rights with the foundational moral rights of competitors, 
consumers, and other idea users. 
X. CONCLUSION
In music, too much cowbell usually spoils a song; in legal theory,
normative concepts become cliché when applied where they do not fit. 
But in at least one song, the cowbell propelled a solid track into a rock
anthem.  And in IP, scholars should remember that the P in IP stands for
property.  So if scholars want to study IP law using philosophical 
methods, they probably should demand property concepts as single-
mindedly as Christopher Walken’s Bruce Dickinson demanded cowbell 
in (Don’t Fear) The Reaper. 
Justifying Intellectual Property does at least as much as any other
contemporary scholarly work to rejuvenate interest in rights- and 
property-based theories of IP.  The book makes a huge contribution by
defending the property rights of idea creators in terms of labor and other 
similar moral foundations.  It makes another huge contribution by
showing how rights-based theories of IP are compatible with the public 
domain.  I think the book’s arguments could be pressed further by 
showing how accession, the control and use paradigms, and other similar
midlevel property principles channel moral rights-claims into specific
legal doctrinal questions.  Even here, however, Merges has still
performed a huge academic service by focusing IP scholars’ attention on 
private law conceptual theory and its implications for IP.  I hope this 
Article has made accessible the accomplishments, the generative aspects,
and the unfinished work of Justifying Intellectual Property. 
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